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Abstract. We introduce a simple dynamical system that describes key features of a bilateral nuclear arms
control regime. The evolution of each party’s beliefs and declarations under the regime are represented, and
the effects of inspection processes are captured. Bounded analysis of this model allows us to explore – within
a finite horizon – the consequences of changes to the rules of the arms control process and to the strategies
of each party, bounded scope invariants for variables of interest, and dynamics for initial states containing
strict uncertainty. Together these would potentially enable a decision support system to consider cases
of interest irrespective of unknowns. We realize such abilities by building a Python package that draws
on the capabilities of a Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solver to explore particular scenarios and to
optimize measures of interest – such as the belief of one nation in the statements made by another, or
the timing of an unscheduled inspection such that it has maximum value. We show that these capabilities
can in principle support the design or assessment of future bilateral arms control instruments by applying
them to a set of representative and relevant test scenarios with realistic finite horizons.
1 Introduction
Arms control agreements are important tools which help nations to manage their security re-
lationships with each other, particularly by reducing the risk of arms races, and which in some
cases seek to eliminate particularly destructive classes of weaponry entirely. It is possible for
these agreements to operate without a verification mechanism, but the absence of such a deter-
rent to cheaters clearly limits their potential effectiveness. Yet the design and implementation
of verification processes are complicated, intrusive and expensive, which imposes limits on the
scale of that deterrent. This tension motivates the need for tools that model, analyse and
optimise verification processes in this domain.
A key element of such a process is the issue by each state, party to the agreement, of a
declaration – a formal statement of the information required under the terms of the agreement:
for example the number of nuclear weapons a state possesses for example, or the locations
where they are deployed. Such declarations form the basis of verification activities, be they
inspections, deployment of monitoring equipment, or any other measures designed to detect
and deter cheating. If such activities prove that the declaration is accurate, then the state that
issued it is deemed to be in compliance with its obligations.
Unfortunately it is impossible to prove with total certainty that a declaration is complete
and correct, regardless of the level of verification activities applied: there will always be a
non-zero probability that verification activities will fail to detect cheating. This means that
each party to an arms-control agreement regularly makes decisions under uncertainty about
the true status of other parties, as well as about the actions it should take in response to
the developments it perceives. One decision is whether other parties are in compliance with
their obligations, but other decisions might concern the timing and rationing out of a limited
number of agreed inspections in order to maximise their effectiveness, or how best to negotiate
the rules of the verification process in the first place. These situations stand to benefit from the
availability of effective decision-support tools.
The stakes for these decisions are particularly high and the circumstances in which they
are made can be very complex, so we are therefore motivated to examine ways in which those
decisions can be supported by robust and algorithmic analytical tools. Game-theoretic frame-
works have been employed in the past to analyse aspects of the problem space (for example,
see [2, 15, 16]) while recent work on Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) [1, 3] has examined how
particular inspection scenarios, and the uncertainty inherent in them, can be modelled. The
case study presented in this paper, meanwhile, is concerned with exploring the potential of
a dynamical systems approach for modelling the interactions and human decision making of
parties in an arms control process. We use as a basis for this exploration a simple, but relevant,
mathematical model of a fictitious nuclear arms control system, which contains key features –
player interaction, incomplete knowledge, imperfect verification, and freedom of strategy – that
a higher-fidelity model would also incorporate. The focus of this paper is not the model used
as the basis for the case study, however, it is rather the development of a methodology for
creating and effectively analysing constrained and bounded dynamical systems by a combina-
tion of algorithms and formal methods. The model problem is used to demonstrate how this
methodology could be used for decision support in nuclear arms control. This methodology will
allow a modeller to under-specify initial states and explore dynamics up to a time horizon that
could be read across to useful real-world timescales. Our findings are captured as a Python
program, IterativeSystems that can be downloaded and installed at a reader’s convenience
from the link at the end of this paper.
2 A model nuclear arms control regime
One possible goal of an arms control process might be to promote transparency between two
rival parties and so reduce the risk of a miscalculation that might result in an arms race.
Reductions in weapon numbers might take place as part of this process, but are not mandated
in this toy process and its mathematical model.
Consider two fictitious nation states (referred to as “nations” below to avoid confusion with
the “states” of a mathematical model below), which have agreed to increase transparency in
their nuclear arsenals by exchanging information on the size of those arsenals on a regular basis.
In our model, the two nations each hold a certain number of weapons, declare to the other party
that they have no more than a certain number of weapons, and hold beliefs about the size of the
other nation’s arsenal. Their declarations may or may not be truthful. Two types of inspection
are carried out by each nation to determine the consistency of the others’ nuclear arsenals with
their declarations: scheduled inspections, which occur at pre-agreed intervals; and no-notice,
unscheduled inspections which are carried out at the discretion of the inspecting nation.
In this model, as in reality, neither type of inspection is perfect, but unscheduled inspections
are more effective at detecting cheating. Each nation, in addition to conducting inspections on
the other nation, may also build or dismantle nuclear weapons (we do not differentiate between
types of nuclear weapons). Their decisions in this respect are partly influenced by the ongoing
arms control processes, and by a combination of their assessment of the difference between
the two arsenals, how much they feel the need to rectify any such perceived differences, and –
indirectly – by their overall strategy in relation to the verification process.
A similar problem was posed at the recent ESGI107 workshop in Manchester [13], where it
was studied by a group of mathematicians that included the first author of this paper. Their
work resulted in a dynamical system similar to that shown in Figure 1, which simulates the
problem as an unconstrained, discrete, non-linear, and iterative process. Although methods
exist for analysing dynamical systems – including the one in [13] – in terms of attractors, say,
our case study is expressly concerned with understanding the consequences of constraining
these dynamics (e.g. occurrence patterns of inspection regimes) and of underspecifying selected
aspects of the system (e.g. the level of fear felt by one nation towards another) in a bounded and
therefore finite horizon, rather than understanding the quality of its unconstrained dynamics.
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Fig. 1. Dynamical system that models the arms control process from the perspective of nation i, based on work done at
ESGI107, but modified to accommodate the exact problem being addressed. W it is the number of weapons nation i holds
at time step t. Variable Bijt models nation i’s belief about nation j’s arsenal size, whereas I
ij
t is the expected number of
weapons to be seen in the inspection of the arsenal. Dit models how many weapons i declares at time t.
We now explain our (unconstrained) mathematical model in more detail, focussing on vari-
ables for nation i, those of nation j have symmetric meaning. Variable W it denotes the actual
number of weapons nation i has at discrete time t. This value updates to W it`1 in Figure 1
as a function of the number of weapons at time t, less the number of weapons destroyed (γi
denoting the rate of destruction) and the number of weapons built.
This proportionate downward pressure on the number of weapons held represents natural
attrition from a stockpile over time; in contrast the term representing the number of weapons
built models a desire by each nation, the strength of which is represented by a ‘fear factor’ F i,
to avoid an excessive perceived advantage for the other nation in stockpile numbers. It would
be straightforward to alter this mathematical model to more closely represent a particular case,
if required, but this simple representation is sufficient to allow evaluation of our methodology.
If there is an inspection, i’s Belief, Bijt , is updated based on a function that compares nation
i’s inspection results to the declaration made by nation j. This updated value is modelled as
a weighted sum of nation i’s beliefs prior to the inspection, the results of the inspection, and
the declaration by nation j. Varying the weights in this sum allows a user to model that nation
i might place more or less value on each of these data points in updating its belief about
the number of weapons that j possesses in reality. For example, if one chose to model the
situation where nation i immediately discounts nation j’s declaration when it is challenged by
inspection results, one would set the relevant weighting parameter αiD to zero; a non-zero value
here might reflect a desire to model anchoring biases on the part of nation i, or a recognition
that inspections are not perfect and that a mistake may have been made. When inspection
results are consistent with the declaration a different set of weights is used to the case where
inspection results are not consistent with the declaration. This switch between the two cases
is managed by the discrete Heaviside step function, which is a useful mathematical way of
making a binary decision, based on a defined condition. It also gives us good opportunity to
showcase our tool’s ability to make such decisions under uncertainty (which we refer to later
as ‘symbolic decision making’). If no inspection occurs, the belief of nation i about nation j’s
arsenal is modelled as a linear extrapolation of the previous two such belief values. In practice
the evolution of belief is much more complicated than this, but there is no reason in principle
why the methodology demonstrated here could not be extended to encompass a more nuanced
model of belief revision.
In this model, an inspection I ijt is an imperfect snapshot taken by nation i of the status
of nation j at time t; it can be thought of as the outcome of a set of activities that result in
an assessed value of nation j’s weapon stockpile. Our modelling of false negatives (pjf´) and
false positives (pjf`) simplifies this somewhat: the former is used as an error rate that dictates
the likelihood that a weapon will be incorrectly judged a non-weapon; the latter is a more
complex term that attempts to represent the likelihood that non-weapons will be judged to be
weapons as well as capturing anchoring biases introduced into nation i’s calculations by nation
j’s declaration.
The expression Ppfounditq models nation i’s perception of the probability that it could be
found cheating in an inspection. A cumulative Binomial formulation with a sigmoidal property
models that probability for false declarations (reflecting that small mis-declarations may be
considered easier to get away with by the nations, but that the perceived risk increases quickly
for larger discrepancies), where the parameters vary according to whether a scheduled (θ)
or unscheduled (Ω) inspection occurs: as noted above, unscheduled inspections increase the
probability of detecting cheating; the perceived probability of being detected therefore also
increases. This probability informs the declaration Dit`1 made by nation i in the next time
step, capturing that nations may “game” the dynamics.
As a nation might employ a variety of tactics, a mixture of different values contribute to its
weapons declaration, Dt`1i . Parameters Ai1, Ai2 and Ai3 flexibly control the relative importance
of consistency with previous declarations, reflecting the true number of weapons, and matching
declarations with the other nation respectively, in a linear sum for the sake of simplicity. To
this nation-specific combination, the model adds a penalty cost multiplied by the probability
of being found cheating; this addition is a simple action to deter under-declaring. We represent
the event of a scheduled inspection from nation i of nation j occurring at time t by θit “ 1.
At all other times, θit equals 0. To represent that these scheduled inspections happen with an
agreed period of n time steps, we update θit`1 to equal 1 after the n preceding values of θim
(for m P pt ´ n, tq) all equal zero. An unscheduled inspection, Ωit can happen at any time a
scheduled inspection does not, subject to any other extra constraints inherent in the agreement.
One such constraint might typically be a limit on the number of unscheduled inspections that
each party is allowed to use in any given time period. This results in a scenario where at each
time step, we may either have no inspections, or at most one inspection – be it a scheduled or
unscheduled one. Our approach allows for and then enforces such extra constraints.
The initial values we choose for the dynamics of this model, potential error rates we sam-
ple from throughout that dynamics, and the dynamical system itself are subject to change
and critique. But we re-iterate that in this paper, we are more concerned with getting usable
analysis methods for such models than with creating a perfect model. Any of the initial values
for this dynamics can be under-specified by a formal parameter such as x (reflecting we don’t
know the concrete value), except for the period and initial placing of scheduled inspections. We
can, however, adjust such periods and initial placings should a given treaty capture them in a
particular way and re-run the model. Importantly, our approach allows us to compute, for a
given number of iterations, lower and upper bounds on variables of interest for the finite time
horizon the model is run over. Such intervals then serve as interpretive scales when computing
values for such variables in specific scenarios. Our approach can either sample error rates mod-
elled in the dynamical system or use fixed estimates to switch between either a probabilistic or
deterministic model. The results reported in this paper have used estimated constants, creating
a deterministic system so that the results could be verified by third parties.
3 Scenarios of interest
We explore below the dynamics of this system up to a specified finite time horizon, k, in three
bounded scenarios (S1)-(S3) chosen to illustrate potential arms control applications and to
allow us to showcase the capabilities of this methodology. Each scenario and associated query
explores different rules for the timing and number of scheduled and unscheduled inspections,
and includes different examples of strict and bounded uncertainty in model variables that might
reflect the circumstances of a real-world decision-support problem. In the examples reported
we use k “ 18.
(S1) There are no scheduled inspections and up to 5 unscheduled ones. What inspection sched-
ule minimises nation i’s weapon arsenal on average, when nation j’s initial declaration Dj0
is uncertain, modeled as x being in t900, 1000, 1100u?
(S2) There are at most 3 unscheduled inspections, and no inspection can happen at adjacent
time steps. Scheduled inspections occur every 6 time steps and start at t “ 1. Nation i’s
initial number of weapons is uncertain, constrained by l ă W i0 ă u. What is the maximum
of Bjik , the number of weapons nation j believes that i owns at t “ k, and what inspection
schedule realises this?
(S3) Scheduled inspections occur every 6 time steps starting at t “ 1 and there are at most 3
unscheduled inspections. The number of weapons nation j owns is always below a tolerance
tol (a constant real) over the length of the treaty, modelled as constraint W jt ă tol for each
1 ď t ď k. The value of initial declaration Di0 is uncertain, and the relationship between
Ai1, A
i
2 and A
i
3 is uncertain but these variables are related by A
i
1 “ 0.5 ¨ x, Ai2 “ 1 ´ 2 ¨ x,
Ai3 “ 1.5 ¨ x for x in t0.15, 0.2, 0.25u. What unscheduled inspection regime minimises the
difference between Bijk and W
j
k overall, i.e. between the number of weapons of nation j
and the number of weapons that nation i believes that nation j holds, and what are these
possible values based on varying Di0 and x?
We model underspecification in a number of ways: strict uncertainty over convex infinite
intervals (such as l ă W j0 ă u as in S2), correlating variables (e.g. the Aim), and decision choices
of one component from a finite set. In the context of such constraints, the queries (S1)-(S3) ask
to maximise both distinct measures of interest, and differences in measures of interest that could
have real impact on exploiting the design space of treaty terms. (S3) with its bounding tolerance
that gives us a range of values to search over, can be used to explore an initial state that a
nation thinks it is in. Generally, we may underspecify initial states to model this constrained
dynamics from an uncertain future state a nation may be interested in. In that sense, the values
of t may therefore be “relative” to reflect a sliding window of time. This allows us to scale up
analyses to wider time horizons: answering queries can inform constraints for future “initial”
states that we can subject to analysis.
4 Implementation
Representation and analysis of the queries and the scenarios they consider is not easily handled
by conventional techniques, and (S3) is particularly challenging. In order to answer the above
questions, we must be able to:
(C1) model temporal aspects of a system
(C2) represent and analyse dynamic, symbolic scenarios (e.g., for when initial conditions are
not known exactly)
(C3) deal with potential probabilistic sampling (e.g., for when choosing to sample an error rate
of an inspection result)
(C4) perform non-linear optimisation for measures of interest and their trade-offs
(C5) certify or formally prove that analysis outputs are correct.
Computing all possibilities of scheduling inspection decisions and creating a “pathway” for
each of these is an expensive process. We define a pathway as a distinct inspection routine
that proposes at which time steps to hold scheduled, unscheduled or no inspections. The set
of pathways for a finite horizon of length k is 2k in the worst case (as a binary decision of
‘whether to inspect’ or ‘not’ is made). We need a modelling and analysis approach that is
scalable and able to cope with such an expensive search space. To achieve this outcome, we
need to judiciously combine different methods in our tool – each specialised in different areas and
techniques – to realise capabilities (C1) - (C5). In our tool, the sampling of error probabilities
for (C3) and complicated calculations from statistical distributions is left to the statistical
environment R [14]. Symbolic decision making is delegated to the SMT solver Z3 [6], along
with witness finding (C2, C4 and C5) for the different queries (S1) to (S3). Python handles all
of the mathematical computations for (C1) and acts as an interface between Z3 and R.
5 Analysis of scenarios
We evaluate our approach and tool by analysing scenarios (S1) to (S3). These analyses and their
interpretation depend on initial declarations of nations and their initial number of weapons.
We assume here that nations have a similar number of weapons but offer a mixture of truthful
and false declarations – as detailed in the data repository whose URL is given at the end of this
paper. The results and compute times for our explicit scenarios below refer to experiments on
a Ubuntu 14.04 server environment with a 3.16.0-38-generic x86 64 kernel and quad core Intel
Core i5-2400 CPU. The computation times reported for (S1) to (S3) are for running the specific
scenario question, and are in addition to the 200 minutes it takes on average for Python and
Z3 to build the model.
Scenario (S1) An SMT decision tree is built for each variable in the model (storing all
the possible values the variables could take, for all potential pathways). To decide between
pathways, Python creates decision variables, DIt s that span the decision trees for the different
variables, and dictate whether or not an inspection takes place at a specified time step s (also
ensuring consistency between the trees regarding the pathway of interest). We may limit the
number of inspections a nation can conduct (e.g. to 5) by adding an SMT assertion to the
solver instance as in s.add(5 >= DIt 0 + DIt 1 + DIt 2+...). Z3, as a constraint solver,
will automatically be able to report back the optimum time steps to place inspections (i.e.
DIt i“ 0 or DIt i“ 1 for each i P t0, 1, 2, ...u) as part of a model witness. When asking
the solver to minimise the number of weapons declared on average, the witness returned will
then contain the inspection routine encoded in the DIt i variables accordingly. Note that for
a finite time period (k), minimising the number of weapons declared on average is the same as
minimising the number of weapons declared in total (just without the unnecessary division of
a constant, noting that divisions may make computations fail since the SMT solver may not be
able to reason about them). In a similar vein to the summation of decision variables DIt, we
create a new TOTAL variable that models the cumulative total of the arsenal over all time steps,
and minimise this as seen in Figure 2. We use inbuilt functions in Z3’s Optimize() package to
handle the minimisation [5, 6]; alternatively we can and do use Z3 as a ‘feasibility checker’ in
the regular Solver() mode to obtain non-linear optimisations up to some accuracy by using
unbounded binary search as in [1]. Having tested both approaches, we can confirm they return
the same results.
The minimal value of the total number of weapons declared over 18 time steps, depends on
the initial values of x, as discussed. The SMT solver also reports a witness for this minimal value
(a solution for all constraints). For x “ 900, it is 5025 (in total, over 18 time steps); and 5061
for x “ 1000. These minima are obtained when no inspections are run in the model. Changing
x to 1100, however, then drops the minimum result to 4969, which occurs when unscheduled
inspections are held in the second, fourth to sixth and ninth time steps. The reason for this
change can be attributed to Dj0 “ 1100 being greater than the number of actual weapons, W j0
we attribute to nation j in our test data.
This reflects that our model is not necessarily linear, and demonstrates how ‘hidden’ vari-
ables in the modelling process can - as in reality - change the optimum decision. We have shown
how under this model, varying x is relevant to making an optimum decision, which could be
particularly useful to a decision maker to know.
s.add(TOTAL == Wi_0 + Wi_1 + Wi_2 +...)
m = s.minimize(TOTAL)
print s.check()
print m.value()
Fig. 2. Python code, using the Z3 API, for minimising the total cumulative weapons arsenal of nation i in Z3, where the
minimum is reported within an average of 300 seconds.
Scenario (S2) To constrain our model such that two inspections may not occur in adjacent
time steps, we simply check the sum of consecutive decision variables that control the model’s
positioning of inspections recursively, e.g. as in s.add(DIt 1 +DIt 2 < 2). This ensures at
most one consecutive time step can model an inspection.
In this scenario, we seek pathways that give the maximum number of weapons that nation
j believes that nation i owns. But let us also compute the minumum for that variable, to
illustrate how to compute an interpretative scale over a finite time horizon. We chose l “ 1000
and u “ 1050 and so the uncertainty 1000 ă W j0 ă 1050 is added as constraint to our model.
We calculated the extremal results for cases of Wj, which coincided with the respective
extremal values of underspecified Wj. The maximum computed for both variables was 756.2,
attained when Wj“ 1050 and on a pathway with scheduled inspections at time steps t “ 1, 7, 13
and a further unscheduled inspection at time steps t “ 3, 5 and 9. The minimum computed for
both variables was 740.2, attained at Wj“ 1000, and had unscheduled inspections at time steps
t “ 11 and 15. This would appear to reflect that the model “believes” lower arsenal counts can
be returned for inspections at certain time points. These results were computed in under 100
seconds. If we so pleased, we could remove the treaty constraints entirely and optimise the model
to calculate interpretive scales for the unconstrained dynamical system, as detailed earlier. It
is also worth noting that the values of parameters γi, F i etc control the ‘intensity’ of change
through the dynamical model; and are available for fine tuning based on expert knowledge of
the domain. Our sample values allow for a noticeable but perhaps unrealistic movement in the
variables over time.
def abs(x):
return If(x >= 0,x,-x)
s.add(DIFF == abs(Bi_18 - Dj_18))
Fig. 3. Definition of absolute value difference in belief Bijk of nation i and actual weapon numbers of nation j, W
j
k .
Scenario (S3) To minimise the difference between what one nation believes about the arsenal
of the other nation and what that other nation actually has, we use the constraint in Figure 3.
We minimise the absolute difference between Bijk and W
j
k in that model. We used tol “ 2500.0
for the constraint W jt ă tol. The results for this are seen in Table 1. Scenario (S3) has uncer-
tainty x, where x is from the finite set t0.15, 0.2, 0.25u, which controls the relationship between
the Aim variables, for m P t1, 2, 3u. We use y to denote the uncertainty in the infinite convex
interval r1000.0, 1010.0s about what value nation i should set for its initial declaration Di0 .
The results of the minimum DIFF between Bijk and W
j
k and its associated unscheduled
inspection regime are recorded in Table 1. We see that the difference between the values Bijk
x minimal DIFF Bijk W
j
k Optimal unscheduled inspection regime
0.15 7.4 317.1 324.5 3rd
0.2 155.6 784.6 629.0 3rd, 5th and 6th
0.25 1129.7 2579.8 1450.1 3rd, 4th and 6th
Table 1. Minimal difference in beliefs and actual weapon numbers in (S3). Over uncertainty y, which models initial
declarations, the minimal difference always stemmed from when y is at its lower end point of the infinite convex interval.
For each value of x, we show the regimes for unscheduled inspections (in addition to the scheduled inspections at
t “ 1, 7, 13) that realise these minimal differences.
and W jk decreases as x decreases suggesting that x “ 0.2 is the best parameter to use in this
model. For x “ 0.3 our model is infeasible as it was unable to satisfy the W jt ă tol constraint.
This illustrates an additional useful feature of constraint solvers in this context: the ability to
highlight either when our model breaks down, or when our constraints will be violated. We see
that variance in DIFF is due to both the changing beliefs of nation i, but also nation j’s arsenal
changes as it responds to the changes in declaration affected by x.
Let us now discuss how parties may independently verify results produced by our tool. The
occurrence patterns of inspection regimes along pathways in scenarios (S1) to (S3) can be vali-
dated by a simple manual check. Similarly, the numerical results of the pathway’s computations
may be checked by simple calculations that don’t require symbolic manipulation as the SMT
analysis returns concrete values. Validating a maximum or minimum is a more difficult task.
Values that can be attained can be certified as just described, but that, say, a maximum is
indeed maximal requires certification of an infeasibility result. This is the equivalent of proving
that it is not satisfiable to meet all required constraints and increase the measure of interest to
a value strictly larger than the reported maximum - which is generally a difficult task.
6 Related and future work
We have also initiated an exploration of how our previous work on constrained Bayesian Belief
Networks (BBN) [1, 3] can be integrated into the dynamical system presented here, in place
or in addition to equations. Such BBNs allow for a much greater level of detail in modelling
an inspection itself, as was shown in [3]. Under-specifications may co-exist between the math-
ematical equations and the BBN either as local or global unknowns. There seems to be no
real restrictions on how BBNs can be moulded to fit with a constrained dynamical system:
as a feasibility study, we have used variables from the dynamical system to control “hard evi-
dence” such as information learned during an inspection that leads to a revision of beliefs and
their probabilities. This could be passed into one of the BBNs used in [1], as well as updating
other equations in the system. We then let output from that BBN contribute to the dynamical
system’s I ijt variable in instances of an inspection taking place.
We view our approach advocated in this case study as complementary to other approaches
in this problem domain – be they based on game theory [2], economic considerations of trust
cultures, policy and reputation based formalisms, dynamical systems and so forth. In fact,
our approach may well be integrated with other approaches [15]. For example, we considered
predicates asking whether the output of a bounded analysis for a dynamical system can be
above some threshold; and such predicates may inform rules within policy-based languages
that evaluate trust – e.g. in the language Peal and its tool PEALT [11].
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we considered a constrained dynamical system that models the possible dynamics
between two nations in an arms inspection and reduction regime. For this dynamics, we wanted
to optimise variables of interest in under-specified scenarios that also capture policies of an
agreement or treaty as constraints, and wanted to compute the “most desirable’ inspection
schedule for an optimal objective of interest.
The unconstrained version of the dynamical system chosen was based on work done by a
group of mathematician at the recent ESGI107 meeting in Manchester [13], including the first
author of this paper. A typical question was the one for scenario (S2): “Unscheduled inspections
(of which there are at most 3) cannot happen at adjacent time steps, scheduled inspections occur
every 6 time steps and start at t “ 1. Nation i’s initial number of weapons is uncertain. Which
inspection schedules give the final extremal number of weapons nation j believes that nation i
owns, Bjik over this under specification, and what are those values?” We then provided such
answers and their evidence.
Our focus here was not on understanding the usual aspects of dynamical systems (e.g. at-
tractors), rather, we wanted to enrich and constrain the dynamics to explore scenarios of interest
in a finite time horizon. This was achieved by adding constraints to the model, for example
ones that capture putative rules or regulations of a treaty, and by under-specifying measures
of interest to model non-deterministic uncertainty in the sense of robust optimization [4].
One advantage of our approach is that it is malleable: it is easy to change constraints and
then rerun the analysis, where we may exploit the ability of SMT solvers to solve incrementally.
Related to that, we can easily support “What if . . . ?” type questions that may be triggered by
results from our tool: e.g. “What if we change the constraints or some constants in a certain
way, how will this affect the value of Bijt ?”
We evaluated our approach and the capabilities of our tool by exploring three scenarios and
pertinent questions about them, demonstrating that we can provide answers within reasonable
compute times for time lines of up to 18 time steps. We have also provided optimisations
to the code that enable us to scale this up to larger sizes (e.g. k “ 27) by using powerful
supercomputing. Finally, our ability to under-specify initial states makes it feasible to do horizon
scanning: exploring the dynamics from a putative region of future states onwards. We believe
that our approach is transferable to other problem domains in which non-linear dynamics is
constrained and where an understanding of bounded behavior is of interest.
The goal of enabling the underspecified modelling process has certainly been achieved,
though its efficacy is naturally reliant on the soundness of an underlying mathematical model.
The approach and tool that we presented here could be re-used for more detailed models than
the one presented here, in this or indeed other domains for different systems.
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